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MODELLING «RACE TO THE BOTTOM» EFFECT  
ON THE SELF-REGULATED MARKETS 
 
Abstract. The effect of the competition among self-regulatory organizations (SROs) on the 
efficiency of the corresponding goods and services markets is studied. It is shown that under certain 
conditions the competition among SROs worsens the quality of the goods and services and leads to 
decreasing consumers’ welfare. Moreover, the distinctive feature of the competition among SROs in 
comparison with other types of regulatory competition is that even introduction of the alternative state 
control does not improve the situation. 
The proposals are formulated for self-regulatory markets’ structure and conditions change in 
order to reduce the negative effects of the SROs’ competition.  
 
Keywords: self-regulation, race to the bottom, regulatory competition, state control, 
hierarchical system, non-cooperative game. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
One of the directions of the modern Russian economy liberalization is partial 
delegation of the state functions of supervision over certain fields of the professional 
activity to the associations of the subjects of these activities - self-regulatory 
organizations (SRO). The number and the scope of such associations in each field are 
determined by the corresponding legislation and the market’s participants preferences. 
The state retains the functions of the institutional framework creation and maintenance to 
support these organizations activity. 
The proponents of self-regulation argue that SRO is an effective tool of market 
regulation, transparent and fully regulated by the law, with clearly defined objectives and 
requirements, provided by the direct participation of the highly qualified professionals, 
their personal liabilities, as well as by the supervision of the state [25].  
The mechanism of self-regulation is long and widely used in the European 
countries and the USA to regulate such specific fields of the professional knowledge as 
securities market, legal activities, corporate management, medicine and some other. The 
operation of the SROs is regulated by the separate laws, specific to the professional field 
of activity [20]. 
In the Russian Federation where the self-regulation was introduced in the late 
1990s, this process, on the one hand, grows rapidly, covering new areas of economic 
activity. On the other hand, it is still far from the complete harmonization of the operation 
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of the parties involved in this interaction that gives rise, in some cases, to inefficiencies in 
its implementation. 
The concept of a SRO first appeared in the Russian legislation in 1995 in the 
document named «Provisional regulations for keeping the register of owners of registered 
securities» [18]. A SRO was defined there as «a voluntary non-profit organization, 
created by professional participants of the securities market and exist in accordance with 
the requirements of the legislation of the Russian Federation on securities» (Art. 2.1). 
The main tasks of a SRO were to develop mandatory standards of its members’ activities 
and to request the Federal Commission on Securities and Stock Markets to issue the 
licenses for the right of professional activity for its members. 
Only in 2007 the Federal law «On self-regulatory organizations» [30] was adopted 
which defined the general principles of creation and operation of the SRO, the subject 
and the scope of self-regulation. With the adoption of this Federal law, as well as a 
number of special laws regulating the activity of the SROs in the specific sectors of the 
economy, an intensive introduction of self-regulation in various fields of professional 
activity began. In 2008 the self-regulation of the appraisal activity was introduced, in 
2009 - in the fields of construction, design, engineering survey, energy survey and audit. 
Currently the mandatory membership in a SRO is provided for ten areas and the 
voluntary membership is provided for another seven areas [25]. 
Despite the widespread usage of the self-regulation on various markets its 
efficiency in comparison with the state regulation is still a subject of the extensive 
discussion in scientific and expert community. 
The professionalism of the participants of this process is called as the main 
advantage of self-regulation. It ensures the implementation of the regulation with 
minimal costs, and the ability to respond rapidly to changes in the industry and market 
conditions [1, 4, 10, 19]. At the same time, the self-regulating markets often face the 
problem of affiliation, when a group of formally independent entities actually forms a 
network structure, artificially limiting the competition and giving the opportunity to its 
participants to gain monopolistic rents [13, 16]. 
A number of the self-regulation failures is well known. In particular, in the UK, 
Germany, the USA and some other countries self-regulation in corporate governance has 
been replaced by the government regulation [20].  
The United Kingdom, one of the leading countries in the field of quality 
regulation, refused from the use of self-regulation of the financial services markets. Self-
regulatory organizations in this field, created in accordance with The Financial Services 
Act (1986), were recognized as incapable to prevent massive violations of the investors’ 
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rights. As a result, in 1997 a single regulator in the field of securities market was created 
on the basis of the Securities and Investments Board (SIB) - the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), accountable to the Ministry of Finance and the Parliament. The self-
regulatory organizations were deprived of the official status and continued to work as 
professional associations [23]. 
Another example is Germany, where the efficiency of self-regulation mechanisms 
in the field of corporate governance was questioned twice, and in both cases the 
voluntary codes (The Insider Trading Code and The Takeover Code) were replaced by 
the relevant legislation (Securities Trading Act and Takeover Act) providing mandatory 
sanctions [9]. 
In the United States due to the lack of confidence to disciplinary procedures 
performed by the advocates in accordance with The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Section 
307, the regulation of these activities was assigned to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) [20].  
These examples show that the introduction of self-regulation does not always lead 
to certainly positive effect on the quality of the market operation. Hence, the relevant 
scientific and practical problem is to find more effective regulatory mechanisms, based 
on a rational combination of public and private regulation that motivate private 
companies to achieve the goals defined by the authorities.  
One of the proposed ways of improving the efficiency of self-regulation is the 
introduction of competition at the level of SRO [5, 11, 12]. Its proponents expect that it 
hinder the formation of network structures, facilitate the entrance into the industry and 
lead to the selection of the most efficient for the consumers standards of behavior.  
However, the empirical observation of the SRO activities in different fields shows 
that in most cases the competition among them even more aggravates the situation on the 
market. For example, the report on the development of self-regulation prepared by the 
Ministry of economic development of Russia [25], indicates a lack of quality control of 
the SROs. It is noted that audits performed by SROs are often formal and that most of the 
SROs standards are of a low quality and essentially mimic the federal legislation.  
As it is noted in [17], a common practice for the SROs in the area of construction 
which operate under intense competition is to reduce the size of entrance and 
membership fees down to the values that cannot ensure their normal functioning. This 
leads to decrease in the quality of SROs regulatory functions and to the use of various 
informal schemes of funds extortion from their members. Similar short-comings are 
noted in the activity of the SROs in the fields of auditing and appraisal services.  
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To the author's knowledge, currently there are no papers devoted to formal 
analysis of the impact of SROs competition on the markets efficiency. The existing 
models of self-regulation [1, 4, 6, 10, 14] consider as a rule a system containing a single 
SRO. The papers [3, 10] analyze bilateral regulation of the market both by the SRO, and 
the state. They show that the presence of an opportunity of state control leads to the 
increase in the efficiency of self-regulation. 
The evidence of the efficiency of SROs’ competition is based on the well-known 
results of regulatory competition theory models, which confirm the consumers’ welfare 
improvement in the presence of the competition in standards [12]. However, they neglect 
the fact that the «consumers» of the SROs’ services are the sellers in the regulated 
market, which are not interested to improve the quality and reduce prices for their 
production. As a result the competition among SROs leads to the negative changes in the 
final consumers’ welfare.  
In this paper the issue of the impact of the SROs’ competition on the market 
efficiency is investigated in the context of vertical effects in the socio-economic 
hierarchical systems. The model of a self-regulated market is formulated and 
investigated. It is shown that SROs’ competition reduces the incentives for the agents on 
this market to improve the quality of their products/services. 
 
2. THE MODEL 
As a basis for further analysis we will use the model of a self-regulated market 
presented in [3]. This paper addresses the case of monopoly regulation of the market by a 
single SRO maximizing the welfare of its members. Two main results received are that 
SRO regulation policy in this case is much softer than the optimal one for the client, and 
that the availability of the alternative state regulation leads to its significant improvement 
which allows to achieve the second-best solution. 
It should be noted that the assumption made in this paper that SRO maximizes the 
welfare of its members contradicts the idea of the self-regulation as a mechanism of 
ensuring the socially effective functioning of the market. Since the SROs are imparted a 
portion of the state power to establish «rules of the game» on the market the effective 
regulation is possible only in the case when the goals of the SROs take into account 
consumers’ interests.  
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The model investigated here differs from the one considered in [3] in two ways. 
First, the criterion of a SRO is defined as the consumer’s welfare, rather than the agent’s 
one. This allows us to avoid considering the effects generated by the possible conflict of 
interests of the consumers and SROs. Second, it is assumed that several SROs operate 
onthe market and that each of them may set its own professional standards. 
Formally self-regulating market is represented by a three-level hierarchical 
system, which includes the sets of the agents providing a certain type of services (A), the 
clients consuming these services (K), and the self-regulatory organizations establishing 
professional standards and controlling their observance (S), see Fig. 1. The activity of a 
SRO in this system can be thought of as a special kind of service – a “regulatory service”.  
So the market considered can be viewed as\consisting of two parts: the base 
market defined by the interaction between the clients and the agents, and the derived 
market of regulatory services rendered by the SROs. 
The base market is described by the standard «principal - agent» model [15]. In 
this model the principal (client) with the reservation utility  hires an agent for certain 
services. The benefit (cash flow) received is a random variable W defined on measurable 
set Ω  R+ having a minimal element w. The realization w of the random variable W is 
known to the agent, but is unknown to the client. 
… 
… 
SRO 
Fig. 1. The scheme of a self-regulated market 
1 2 k 
Agents 
Clients 
S R O   c o m p e t i t i o n 
… … … 
… … … … 
Base 
market 
1 2 k 
Regulatory 
services 
“market” A g e n t s   c o m p e t i t i o n 
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A client and an agent
1
 sign a contract that defines the size of the payments from 
the agent to the client as a function z(r) ≥ 0, where r is the information about the 
realization w which agent reports to the client. The remaining part of the cash flow 
constitutes the agent’s profit from her professional activity: 
y(w, r) = w – z(r). (1) 
We abstract from the effects of risk sharing among the agent and the customer 
considering like in [3] a risk-neutral consumer which maximizes an expected return, and 
risk-averse agent which maximizes the utility of the received income, represented by 
increasing concave function v(y) with v(0) = 0. 
The consumer’s strategy is the choice of the parameters of the contract z(r), the 
agent’s strategy is the information reported to the client as a function of the random 
variable realization r(w). The information asymmetry among the client and the agent 
leads to the problem of moral hazard on this market since the opportunistic agent can 
provide a false information to the client.  
The SROs which form the top level of the hierarchy set performance standards for 
their members and monitor them. We assume that the membership in a SRO is 
compulsory for an agent, and that each agent belongs to the only one SRO. To ensure the 
compliance of the market participants with the quality standards a SRO is endowed with 
the power to audit the performance of the contracts by its members and to apply 
penalties. We assume that each SRO conducts an audit of an agent with the probability 
p(r), depending on the agent’s report. The auditing of an agent is costly to the SRO. The 
expenses c  0 are compensated by charging a fixed fee t with each contract made by the 
SRO’s members. 
The audit reveals the true value of w, and when there is a difference of the 
information provided by the agent r, and the real value of cash flow w the agent pays the 
penalty x(w, r)  0. It is assumed that the agents have limited liability, so their total 
payments cannot exceed the amount of cash flow: 
z(r) + x(r, w)  w. (2) 
The triple i = (pi(r), xi(w, r), ti) is the regulation strategy of the i-th SRO. We 
denote by  the set of all possible regulation strategies. 
The strategy chosen by a SRO must ensure the profitability of its activities, i.e. it 
must satisfy the SRO’s budget constraint: 
t  E(p(r(W))(c – x(W, r(W)))), (3) 
                                              
1
  We assume all the groups of the participants in the model (customers, agents and SROs) to be homogeneous. So, 
everywhere forth, where it would not cause a misunderstanding, representative participants will be considered 
and the corresponding indices in the variables and functions will be omitted. 
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where E denotes the mathematical expectation. 
The purpose of the SRO is to maximize the expected welfare of consumers, who 
have contracts with its members: 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ),Q U       (4) 
where  - the regulation strategies profile of all SROs in the market; ()  - the share of 
clients served by the members of the SRO under the profile ; ˆ ( )U   - the objective 
function of a client on the optimal contract z
*
(r; ) which is determined as a solution of 
the problem: 
  
( )
( ( ); ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) max,W
z
U z r E z r W t z r w dF w t


       (5) 
with respect to the client’s individual rationality condition: 
( ( ); )U z r     (6) 
and the agent’s limited liability condition (2). 
The agent for the each realization of the cash flow w chooses the strategy r(w) 
which maximizes her expected utility with respect to the terms of the contract z(r) and 
regulation strategy : 
( ( ); ( ), ) (1 ( ( ))) ( ( ( ))V r w z r p r w v w z r w    
 
( )
( ( )) ( ( ( )) ( ( ), )) max.
r
p r w v w z r w x r w w

     (7)
 
As a starting point for further analysis we consider the market regulated by a 
single SRO.
2
 In this case Ф()  1 and the criterion (4) takes the form 
*ˆ( ) ( ) ( ( ; ); ).Q U U z r       (8) 
The interaction in this system (let us call it model 1) includes the following steps: 
1. SRO chooses regulation strategy  = (p(r), x(w, r), t). 
2. Given the strategy , the client offers an agent a contract z(r). 
3. If the agent does not accept the terms of the contract, the participants receive 
their reservation utilities (agent - 0, client - ) and the interaction ends. Otherwise, the 
client pays the agent’s SRO value t and the interaction continues. 
4. The agent observes the realization w of the random variable W. 
5. The agent provides the client with the information r and pays her the 
amount z(r). 
6. SRO investigates the agent with the probability pr incurring costs c and 
collecting the penalty xw, r 
                                              
2
  So, this model differs from the one described in [24] only by the form of the SRO’s criterion. 
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As it is noted in [3] the interaction described by the model 1 is not the standard 
«principal - agent» problem since the decisions on the different components of the agent 
stimulating mechanism are made by different participants. The amount of payments z(r) 
is defined as the solution of client's problem in the stage 2, and the investigation 
probability pr and the penalty size x(w, r) are the elements of the SRO’s strategy which 
is determined in the step 1. Considering the model 1 for the case when the SRO 
maximizes the utility of agent (7), the authors in [3] establish that in an equilibrium too 
liberal regulation strategy is chosen which significantly weaken the competition in the 
underlying market.
3
 
In contrast here we consider the case when the client’s utility function (5) and the 
SRO’s criterion (8) are the same differing only in the sets of optimization parameters. 
Therefore the SRO in the model 1 can implement the second best solution (taking into 
account the information asymmetry), as a result of solving the problem of maximizing 
client’s utility function (5) with respect to (z(r), ). This is a well-studied standard 
"principal - agent" problem [8, 15]. According to the revelation principle [2], its solution 
can be found in the class of direct mechanisms when the agent reports the truthful 
information about the cash flow realization: 
r(w) = w. 
The strategy (z(r), ) which ensures the agent’s truthful information must satisfy 
the following incentive compatibility conditions: 
 w, r  : v(w – z(w))  (1 – p(r)) v(w – z(r)) + p(r) v(w – z(r) – x(w, r)).  (9) 
As it is shown in [3] the optimal regulation strategy in this case requires imposing 
the maximal penalty on the agent for the false message with regard the limited liability 
condition (2) and no penalty for the true one: 
* ( ), ;( , ) 0, .w z r r wx r w r w   .  (10) 
As a result the incentive compatibility constraints (9) take the form: 
 w, r  : v(w – z(w))  (1 – p(r)) v(w – z(r)) + p(r) v(0).  (11) 
Since in equilibrium all the agents report the true information then there is no 
penalty and the SRO’s budget constraint is 
t
 *
 = cE(p(r(W))),  (12) 
                                              
3 
 This statement is true for the model with a fixed set of agents. If the entry of new agents on the market is 
possible the regulation liberalization does not necessarily lead to the competition weakening, as the reduction of 
barriers can attract new market participants. In this case the nature of the competition changes passing from the 
quality competition to the price one. 
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Due to the above-mentioned possibility of implementing the "second best" 
solution the optimal contract z
*
(r) and the audit strategy p
*
(r) in this model are defined as 
a solutions of the optimization problem 
 * *
( ( ) ( ))
( ( ), ( ), ( , ), ) ( ) ( ) ( ) max ,W
z p
U z r p r x r w t z w cp w dF w
 

  
  
(13) 
regarding the limited liability condition (2), the incentive compatibility constraints (11) 
and the consumer’s individual rationality (6). 
The optimal contract z
*
 is the “second best” solution which maximizes the 
consumers’ welfare under asymmetric information. Generally its form depends on the 
audit cost c and cash flow W distribution. 
Consider now the situation when there are k SRO’s operate on the market i.e. S = 
{1, ..., k}. The SROs set the standards of their members’ activity and monitor their 
observance. The regulation strategy of the i-th SRO is the set i = (pi(r), xi(w, r), ti). The 
choice of the lambdas by all the SROs in the market generates a regulation profile  = 
(1, 2, ..., k). 
Assume that the sets of the agents and the clients are isomorphic to [0, 1]. Each 
agent x  [0, 1] can choose a SRO for membership. Let us denote i the fraction of the 
agents which are the members of the i-th SRO and let  = (1, …, k). Due to our 
assumptions about membership in SRO 
1
1.
k
i
i
    (14) 
In general the members of different SROs can offer a client different terms of the 
contracts. So the consumer has an additional optimization parameter – the number of 
SRO i  S with a member of which she signs the contract. 
So the parties’ interaction in this system takes the following form (model 2): 
1'. Each SRO chooses a regulation strategy i = (pi(r), xi(w, r), ti). 
2'. Given the regulation profile  each agent chooses a SRO for membership. The 
choices of all agents form a partition of the agents’ set (). 
3'. Given the regulation profile   and the partition () the client chooses the SRO 
with a member of which she will make a contract. 
4'. The client offers the agent a contract z(r). 
5'. If the agent does not accept the terms of the contract, the participants receive 
their reservation utilities (agent - 0, client - ) and the interaction ends. Otherwise, the 
client pays the agent’s SRO value ti and the interaction continues. 
6'. The agent observes the realization w of the random variable W. 
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7'. The agent provides the customer with the information r and pays her the 
amount z(r). 
8'. The i-th SRO investigates its members with the probability pir incurring the 
cost c and receiving the penalty xiw, r 
At the stage 1' SROs choose parameters of their regulation strategies i   so as 
to maximize their criteria Qi(), defined by (4). The resulting regulation profile  = (1, 
2, ..., k) can be associated with the set of affordable regulation strategies 1()   
which consist of the regulation strategies used at least by one SRO: 
1() = {  :  i: i = }. 
The agent’s problem which is solved on the stage 2' is to choose from the set 1() 
the strategy which maximizes her expected utility: 
   
1
* *
( )
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ; ( ; ), ) ( ) ( ( ; )) ( ) max ,WV I E V W z r I v w z w dF w


         
λ
 (15)
 
where I() is the indicator function which takes the value 1 if there is a client which 
makes contract with the agent and 0 in the opposite case. 
The solution of this problem by all agents in the system determines their allocation 
() and the feasible regulation strategies set 2()  1() consisting of the regulation 
strategies i such that i() > 0. It follows from (15) that 
1
2
( )
ˆ( ) Arg max ( ).V
 
  
 
Let us assume that in the case when more than one SRO uses a strategy from 2() 
the agent can choose each of them with equal probability, i.e. 
2
2
1 , ( ),
( )
0, ( ),
i
i
i
l  
  
 
λ
λ
λ  
(16)
 
where l is the number of the SROs which use the strategies from 2(). 
At the stage 3 each client chooses an agent to contract with. Since the agents in 
the model are identical the client’s utility does not depend on the agent’s number but on 
her SRO regulation strategy. Hence the following maximization problem arises at the 
stage 3'. 
2
*
( )
ˆ ( ) ( ( ; ); ) max .U U z r

    
λ
  (17)
 
A solution of this problem gives us a set of regulation strategies *()  2(), 
such that the contracts will be made only with the members of SROs using them: 
2
*
( )
ˆ( ) Arg max ( ).U

  
λ
λ
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The indicator function I() in (15) takes the form: 
*
*
1, ( ),
( )
0, ( ).
I
 
  

λ
λ  
(18)
 
Then the share of the clients which make a contract with the members of the i-th 
SRO is  
*( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
j
ji i iI
 

 
    
 

λ
λλ λ . 
At the stages 4' – 8' the optimal contract is determined and implemented under 
fixed regulation strategy. These stages are fully equivalent to the stages 2 – 6 of the 
model 1. The solutions of the corresponding sub-games represent the terms of the optimal 
contracts z
*
(r; ) offered to the members of a SRO with the regulation strategy . 
In contrast with the model 1 the stages of determination of different elements of 
agent’s stimulation mechanism (i, z(r)) are divided here by her move and cannot be 
obtained as a single optimization problem solution. It will be shown below that this fact 
significantly affects the properties of the resulting equilibria. 
Let us find a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the model 2. Due to the above 
mentioned equivalence of the last five stages in the both models the optimal contract z
*
(r; 
) under fixed SRO regulation strategy  is identical to the one chosen in the model 1.  
We will assume that z
*
(r; ) is defined on the whole set of regulation strategies i.e. 
the constraints (2), (6), (9) in the client’s problem are compatible. 
At the stages 2' and 3' the agents and the clients respectively choose a SRO which 
offers the best conditions. For a certain regulation profile  introduce the following 
values: 
 
1
* *
( )
( ) max ( ; ( ; ), )V E V W z r

  
λ
λ , (19) 
2
*
( )
ˆ( ) max ( )U U

 
λ
λ . (20) 
Since the agent’s optimal strategy in (15) is to participate in a SRO having a 
feasible regulation strategy then for each agent 
*ˆ( ) ( ).V V  *λ  
Likewise the optimal client’s solution in (17) is to make a contract with a member 
of a SRO such that  *(*). Then  
* *ˆ ( ) ( )iU U 
*λ . 
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So each regulation profile  can be associated with a pair (U*(), V*()), which 
describes the state of the corresponding market. 
Let M = {(U
*
(), V*()) |   k} be the set of every possible market states under 
the regulation profiles from the set . M is limited due to (2) and (6). 
We call a state (U, V)  M as an effective one if there is no other element which 
Pareto-dominates (U, V). The set of effective states we denote by P (Fig. 2). A regulation 
profile * is called effective if the corresponding state (U*(*), V*(*))  P. 
The situation when all the SROs use the "second best" solution that gives the 
maximum expected revenue to the client is an extreme point of the set of effective 
regulation profiles. The other extreme point is the profile consisting of the regulation 
strategies defined in [3, proposition 2] which maximizes the expected utility of an agent. 
The set of such strategies 0 is determined as a solution of the problem 
 *
( , )
( ; ( ; ), ) max,
z p
E V W z r     (21)
 
under conditions (2), (6), (10), (11), (12). 
The following result holds. 
Proposition 1. Every regulation profile * which generates subgame-perfect 
equilibrium in model 2 is effective. 
Proof. Assume the contrary, i.e. that certain regulation profile  exists such that 
U
*
()  U*(*), V*()  V*(*) and at least one inequality is strict. Consider a strategy 
  *() and construct profile  such that i =  for certain i and j = j
*
 for j  i. 
V 
*
 
Vmax 
Fig. 2. An effective market states set 
U 
*
 
Vmin 
 Umax 
A 
B 
М 
P 
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Let us study the case U
*
() > U*(*), V*()  V*(*). The client who make a 
contract with a member of the i-th SRO under the regulation profile  receives expected 
payoff 
* *ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).i jU U U U      
*λ λ  
According to the optimal strategy at the stage 3' all clients in the system will make 
contracts with members of the i-th SRO, therefore *() = {}. It follows from (18) 
that in this case the members of the i-th SRO have a non-zero income while the income 
of the other agents is zero, therefore i()  
1
/k. Then the i-th SRO criterion value is 
* * *1 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),i i iQ U U U Qk k
       * *λ λ λ λ λ λ  
i.e. it has increased as a result of the deviation.  
Let us study the case V
*
() > V*(*). The expected profit of the i-th SRO member 
under regulation profile  exceeds the one for the members of other SROs. The solution 
of (15) gives us that 2() = {}, i.e. all agents in the system will choose to join the i-th 
SRO. Since *()  2() then all clients at the stage 3 will contract with the members 
of the i-th SRO. Then 
* * *1( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),i i iQ U U U Qk
       * *λ λ λ λ λ λ  
i.e. the i-th SRO criterion has increased as a result of the deviation.  
Thus, in the both cases the deviation from the profile * is beneficial for the i-th 
SRO, therefore this profile cannot be a part of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. ■  
This result demonstrates that self-regulation allows to implement the states of the 
underlying market which are Pareto-efficient in the multicriteria problem with criteria 
(U
*
(), V*()). However, these solutions can vary considerably by their preferability for 
the clients, and therefore, by the corresponding market equilibrium effectiveness. 
Let us define the following values for every pair of regulation profiles , : 
* *( , ) ( ) ( )V V V     λ λ λ λ , 
* *( , ) ( ) ( )U U U     λ λ λ λ . 
We call as equivalent the regulation profiles ,  such that ( , ) 0V   λ λ  and 
( , ) 0U   λ λ .  
Corollary. For any two non-equivalent regulation profiles , , which generate 
subgame-perfect equilibria, the following ratio holds: 
( , )
0
( , )
U
V
 

 
λ λ
λ λ
.  (22) 
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Proof. The inequality (22) is violated only in the cases when either 
* *( ) ( )V V λ λ , * *( ) ( )U U λ λ  or * *( ) ( )V V λ λ , * *( ) ( )U U λ λ , and one of the 
inequalities in each group is strict (since the profiles are non-equivalent). In any case, one 
of the equilibrium profiles is not effective, contrary to the claims of proposition 1. ■ 
Thus, all subgame-perfect equilibria in this system which generated by non-
equivalent regulation profiles are ordered by their preference for the customers and for 
the agents. The more preferred equilibrium for the clients, the less it is preferred for the 
agents and vice versa. 
Now we are ready to formulate the main result of this paper. 
Proposition 2. If the set P of the effective market states is a continuous curve in 
the space (U
*
, V
*
), then any subgame-perfect equilibrium is generated by equivalent 
regulation profiles * = (*1, 
*
2, ..., 
*
k), such that  
 i  S i
*
  0,  (23) 
where 0 is the set of solutions of the problem (21). 
To prove this result, we need the following property of the regulation profiles, 
generating subgame-perfect equilibria. 
Lemma 1. Let the regulation profile * = (1
*
, ..., k
*
) generates a subgame-
perfect equilibrum. Then for any i  S holds: 
* *ˆ( ) ( )iV V 
*λ , * *ˆ ( ) ( )iU U 
*λ . 
The proof of this result follows immediately from the form of the agent’s and 
client’s problems (15), (17). Indeed, (15) implies that for every feasible regulation 
strategy  2(
*
) the equality holds 
*ˆ( ) ( ).V V  *λ  
It follows from (17) that for each regulation strategy  *(*) * *ˆ ( ) ( )iU U 
*λ . 
Let us prove that in every subgame-perfect equilibrium  i  S i
*
  *(*). 
Indeed, if for any i  S: i
*
  *(*), then from (18) it follows that I(i
*
) = 0, hence 
Qi(
*
) = 0. But in this case the choice of any strategy   *(*) by the i-th SRO leads to 
I() = 1 and i() > 0. 
Then the i-th СРО receives strictly positive payoff i.e. regulation profile * does 
not generate equilibrium. ■ 
Proof of proposition 2. 
Let us prove that a regulation profile * which satisfies (23) generates a subgame-
perfect equilibrium. 
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Since the expected payoff of the members of any SRO under regulation profile * 
is the same then the choice of the agents’ optimal strategies (16) in the stage 2 leads to 
the symmetric allocation  i = 1, ..., k i(
*
) = 
1
/k.  
As it is shown in [3, proposition 3] the optimal behavior at the stages 4 – 8 
implies that for any regulation strategy   0 client’s individual rationality constraint 
(6) is satisfied as equality. In this case client at the stage 3 will be indifferent among the 
SROs hence  i  S Фi(
*
) = i(
*
) and any SRO’s payoff is 
( ) .iQ k
*λ  
Consider a deviation of the i-th SRO which generates a new regulation profile  
such that i 
0
 and j = 
*
j for j  i. In this case 
*ˆ( ) ( )jV V 
*λ , therefore it is not 
profitable for the agents to participate in the i-th SRO i.e. i() = 0. Then 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 ( ).i i i iQ U Qk
        *λ λ λ  
Thus it is not profitable for any SRO to deviate at the stage 1' from regulation 
profile *. Since the other parties at the remaining stages of the game follow their optimal 
strategies this profile generates subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Now let us prove that no other regulation profile leads to a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. Due to the result of proposition 1 we can limit our consideration by the 
effective profiles. 
Assume that an effective profile  = (1, 2, …, k) exists which does not satisfy 
the condition (23) and generates a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Then it follows from 
Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 that for every i  S holds 
* *ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ) ,iU U U     
*λ λ
 
* *ˆ( ) ( ) ( ),iV V V   
*λ λ
 
The payoff of any SRO under regulation profile  is 
*1( ) ( ).iQ Uk
 λ λ  
Consider for certain   (0, *( )U   λ ) an effective profile  such that 
* *( ) ( ) .U U   λ λ
 
This profile exists due to our assumption about Pareto frontier continuity.   
Consider a regulation strategy   
*
() and construct the regulation profile  = 
1 2( , , , )k      such that for certain i  S i  =  and j j     for j  i. We will show 
that the profiles  and  are equivalent. 
Indeed, since the profile  is effective and   
*
()  2(), therefore 
* *ˆ ( ) ( ) ( ),U U U    λ λ
 
* *ˆ( ) ( ) ( ).V V V    λ λ  
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Then under the profile  for every j  i the inequality is held 
* *ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).i j jV V V V V V            λ λ  
In this case the agent’s problem solution at the stage 2 under regulation profile  
is to choose the i-th SRO and the resulting agents distribution takes the form i() = 1, 
j() = 0 for all j  i. The set of feasible regulation strategies is 2() = {}. Since 
*()  2() and 
*ˆ ( ) ( )U U    λ , then 
*
() = {} and all clients can make 
contracts only with the members of the i-th SRO. Therefore 
* *ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),iV V V V      λ λ  
* *ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ),iU U U U      λ λ  
i.e. the regulation profile  is equivalent to . 
The value of the i-th SRO criterion on the regulation profile  is 
*ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,i i iQ U U U          λ λ λ  
that is more than Qi() for sufficiently small . 
So, under the regulation profile  it is profitable for every SRO to deviate and to 
use the strategy . This contradicts to the assumption that the profile  generates a 
subgame perfect equilibrium. ■ 
The economic sense of the proposition 2 is that competition among SROs leads to 
an ineffective equilibrium on the underlying market, which corresponds to the solution of 
the monopolistic agent. 
The requirement of the Pareto frontier continuity is essential for the result 
obtained. As an example, let us consider a system with two-element set of feasible 
regulation strategies: the "second best" A and the monopolistic agent’s solution B. It is 
easy to show that if ˆ ( )AU k    then both regulation profile, consisting of the strategies 
A and the profile that consists of the strategies B generate subgame-perfect equilibria.  
The result of the introduction of self-regulation on such market depends on its 
initial state. If in the beginning of this process the agents adhere to high standards of 
quality then the resulting state of the system will be effective for the customers. 
Otherwise, the self-regulation leads to the "institutional trap" when the system is "frozen" 
in an inefficient state [26]. 
This type of behavior, at least partially, allows to explain the fact that the "success 
stories" of the self-regulation implementation, as a rule, associated with the markets 
where a well-developed regulatory framework or other mechanisms (tradition, reputation 
and so on) allowing to maintain a high quality of service have already been existed. The 
introduction of the self-regulation "from the scratch", for the markets having no set of 
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rules, usually led to the collapse of this mechanism and the necessity of the state 
interference in their activities. 
The decline in the quality of the of the regulators’ activities as a result of their 
competition, called "race to the bottom", is well studied for the systems of the 
jurisdictions competing for investments and taxpayers (tax and more widely institutional 
competition). As it is shown in [22], this phenomenon represents a special case of vertical 
effects of the competition in hierarchical socio-economic systems, which result in 
simultaneous changes in the agents’ competition acuity at different levels of the hierarchy 
in response on some change in the system parameters. 
For the self-regulating markets considered here the vertical effects of competition 
manifest themselves in the increase in competition of the agents on the underlying market 
as a result of the decrease in the "competition" among SROs. 
 
3. SELF-REGULATED MARKET MODEL WITH ALTERNATIVE 
STATE SUPERVISION  
Since the introduction of self-regulation may result in a decrease in the efficiency 
of the market equilibrium, a significant part of the research of self-regulation is devoted 
to mechanisms of the reduction of these negative effects. One of the most commonly 
discussed methods is the alternative state supervision over the market [3, 7, 10]. Further 
we consider the impact of this mechanism on the efficiency of equilibria in the presence 
of SRO’s competition. 
In [3] the model of the self-regulating market with state supervision is investigated 
where the state maximizes consumers’ utility and has regulation powers similar to SRO. 
The costs of the agents’ auditing for the state is cg. The introduction of self-regulation in 
this case makes sense only if cg  c. 
The agents are audited by the state with probability pg(r), a fixed fee tg is charged 
from each contract to offset the corresponding state costs. If the state audit of an agent 
detects a false reporting, the state imposes a fine xg(r, w) on the agent. The value xg(r, w) 
is not necessarily the same as the fine x(r, w) imposed by the SRO. In [3, proposition 7] it 
is shown that in such system SRO, maximizing the welfare of its members adheres to 
much more stringent strategy, coinciding with the "second-best" solution under state 
regulation. 
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Such dramatic change in the regulatory strategy of the SRO in the presence of the 
alternative state supervision is explained in [8] by analogy with the formation of entry 
barriers in monopoly markets. The monopolist in the market of regulatory services (SRO) 
does not allow to enter the potential "competitor" (state), supporting more stringent 
standards than optimal ones from the point of view of the state. However, in contrast to 
classical models of entry barriers, the crowding out of the "competitor" is achieved here 
by investing in increasing of his welfare. 
Let us study now the effect of the alternative state supervision on the SROs’ 
regulatory strategies when they compete. Since the state authority on the regulatory 
services market is significantly larger than SROs’ one the introduction of the alternative 
state supervision leads to the emergence of a hierarchy on this market (Fig. 3). The state 
in this structure plays the role of the "leader" empowered with the right of the first move 
[21] and establishing general "rules of the game" on the market which we denote as . 
The SROs form the second level of the hierarchy and choose their strategies i() 
taking into account the state policy .  
… 
… 
SRO’s 
Fig. 3. A self-regulated market with alternative state supervision 
1 2 k 
Agents 
Clients … … … 
… … … … 
Base 
market 
1 2 k 
«Regulatory 
service» market 
A g e n t s ’   c o m p e t I t I o n 
State 
S R O s ’   c o m p e t I t I o n 
… Alternative state monitoring 
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Then the regulation profile in this model will include the state policy and the 
regulation strategies of all SROs: 
 = (, 1(), …, k()). 
The utility of a client, who makes a contract z(r) with the i-th SRO member under 
regulation profile  is 
( ( ); ) ( ( ; ); ) ( ) ( ) ( ),W i gU z r z r w dF w t t

  λ λ λ λ λ
  
(24) 
where the value of the fee ti is determined individually for each SRO while tg is the same 
for all market participants. 
The utility function of the state in this system represents the total clients’ welfare 
or what is the same the total welfare of the SROs: 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).
k k
i i i
i i
G Q U
 
    λ λ λ
  
(25) 
where i() is the share of the contracts made by the members of the i-th SRO; 
*( ) ( ( ); )i iU U z rλ λ  is the welfare of a client who signed the optimal contract zi
*
(r) with 
a member of the i-th SRO. 
In contrast to the model with a single SRO, to ensure the uniform quality control 
of the agents throughout the market, the state must compensate for the "failures" of the 
SROs’ regulatory policy, providing more frequent audit of the members of those SROs, 
which use a more lenient regulatory strategy. In this case pg(r) is the average probability 
of the state audit throughout the market, whereas the probability of the audit of the i-th 
SRO member ( )
g
ip r  depends on the regulatory strategy of the SRO. 
Let us assume that the state has information about the agents audited by SROs. 
Since the audit is costly for the state there are no redundant audits in equilibrium [3]. In 
this case the probability of the state audit of the members of the i-th SRO ( )
g
ip r  satisfies 
the condition 
( ) ( ) (1 ( )) ( ),gg i i ip r p r p r p r  
  
(26) 
therefore 
( ) ( )
( ) max , 0 .
1 ( )
g ig
i
i
p r p r
p r
p r
 
  
    
(27) 
Similarly to [3] we assume that the state may impose penalties, other than SROs’ 
ones. In this case, the effective fine imposed on the agent is xg(w, r). When the agent is 
audited by SRO the share min{xi, xg} of the fine is collected by SRO and max{xg – xi, 0} 
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– by the state. In the case of the state audit the entire value of xg comes to the state 
budget. 
The i-th SRO’s budget constraint (3) takes the form 
( ( ( )))( min{ ( , ( )), ( , ( ))}).i i g it E p r W c x W r W x W r W 
  
(28) 
The audit costs for the state depends on the resulting distribution of the contracts 
among the SROs Фi(). But since the payment tg is determined prior to the transactions in 
the underlying market some forecast ( )i λ  of this distribution should be used in order to 
balance the budget of the state. We assume that the state's expectations are rational, i.e. 
( ) ( )i i λ λ . Then the budget constraint would be
4
 
1
1
( ) ((1 ( ( )) ( ( )))
( ) ((1 ( ( ))) ( ( )) ( , ( )))
( ( ))max{ ( , ( )) ( , ( )), 0}).
k
g
g i i i g
i
k
g
i i i g
i
i g i
t E p r W p r W c
E p r W p r W x W r W
p r W x W r W x W r W


   
   
 


λ
λ  
The first term in the right hand side of this constraint represents the average cost of 
the state audit of a contract, the second one is the average size of penalties coming into 
the state budget from an audit conducted by a SRO or state. 
Taking into account (24) this constraint can be converted to the form 
 
 
1
( ( ( ))) ( , ( ))
( ) ( ( ( ))) min{ ( , ( )), ( , ( ))} .
g g g g
k
i i g i g
i
t E p r W c x W r W
E p r W c x W r W x W r W

  
   λ   
(29) 
The resulting interaction in the presence of the state control (model 3) is as 
follows. 
1. The state determines the regulation policy = (pg(r), xg(w, r)). 
2. Given the policy  SROs set their regulation strategies i() = (pi(r; ), xi(w, r; 
), ti()). 
3. Given the regulation profile  the agents choose SRO i to join. The choices of 
all agents in the system result in a partition of the set of agents (). 
4. Given the regulation profile   and the partition () the state determines the 
probability of the audit of the i-th SRO members and the rate tg charged from each 
contract on the underlying market. 
                                              
4
  To avoid complications further we drop the argument  in the notation of the functions, where it does not entail 
confusion.  
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5. Given the parameters , () and tg the client chooses the SRO i with a 
member of which she will make a contract. 
6. The client offers the contract z(r) to a member of the i-th SRO. 
7. If the agent does not accept the terms of the contract, the participants receive 
their reservation utilities (agent - 0, client - ) and the interaction ends. Otherwise, the 
client pays ti to the i-th SRO and tg to the state budget and the interaction continues. 
8. The agent observes the realization w of the random variable W. 
9. The agent provides the customer with the information r and pays her the 
amount z(r). 
10. The i-th SRO investigates the agent with the probability pi(r) incurring cost c 
and collects the share min{xi(w, r), xg(w, r)} while the state receives max{xg(w, r) – 
xi(w, r), 0}. 
11. The state investigates members of the i-th SRO with the probability ( )gip r  
incurring cost cg and collects the value xg(w, r). 
This scheme is similar to the interaction described by the model 2 except the steps 
1, 4 и 11 where the state determines the elements of its regulation strategy and 
oversees the activities of the agents. 
Let us compare the equilibrium in this system with the one under "pure" state 
regulation. The model of the state regulation on this market is identical to the model 1 
where the SRO criterion has the form (8). So the equilibrium in the state regulation 
model is the "second best" solution with the audit cost equal to cg. 
Denote by  the set of the state regulation strategies which correspond to the 
individually rational for customers equilibria. We will consider the non-trivial case, when 
the individual rationality constraint at the "second best" solution is strict. 
Let us find the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the model 3. First we note that 
Lemma 1 remains true for this system. Therefore, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium the 
utilities of agents and clients will not depend on their choice of the SRO.
5
  
The penalties for all agents operating in the market are the same and equal to 
xg(w, r). If for certain r     the i-th SRO sets the probability of the audit pi(r) ≥ pg(r) 
then for such r in accordance with (27) pi
g
(r) = 0 and the interaction on the market is 
similar to that in the system without state regulation. If pi(r) < pg(r), then the state fully 
compensates the deviations of the SROs from the policy . As a result regardless of the 
strategy chosen by SRO, its members will be audited with the same probability pg(r). 
                                              
5
  The proof of this result is identical to Lemma 1 and is not given here. 
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Further we show that in an equilibrium the second case is implemented. 
Lemma 2. Let the state regulation policy    and the regulation profile  = (, 
1, …, k) generates a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the model 3. If client’s profit U
*
(λ) 
is continuous in the equilibrium neighborhood by the parameters of the SROs’ regulation 
strategies , then for any nonzero measure set    the following inequality holds: 
 i = 1, …, k, ( ) ( ) .i gp r dr p r dr
 
   
Proof. It follows from Lemma 1 that the utility of all agents in the market under 
regulation profile  is the same and is equal to V*() and the profit of each client is U*(). 
So the value of every SRO’s criterion is 
*1( ) ( ).iQ Uk
λ λ  
Since the profile  generates equilibrium and    then U*()  . 
Let us assume that Lemma 1 is not fulfilled here i.e. for certain SRO a nonzero 
measure set    exists such that 
( ) ( ) .i gp r dr p r dr
 
    
The effective probability of the i-th SRO members audit in this case is 
ˆ ( ) max{ ( ), ( )}.i i gp r p r p r  
Assume that the i-th SRO chooses a regulation strategy i = (pi(r), ti) such that for 
 r   pg(r)  pi(r) < pi(r) and pi(r) = pi(r) otherwise and SRO’s budget constraint (28) 
holds as equality in the corresponding equilibrium. 
The choice of an audit probability pi(r) < pi(r) by the i-th SRO leads to an increase 
in the right hand sides of the incentives compatibility conditions (9) corresponding to the 
information r that results in narrowing of the set of feasible solutions of the problem (13). 
So the amount of payment to the client at the optimal contract does not increase while 
lowering the audit probability 
r   z*(r; i)  z
*
(r; i).  (30) 
It follows from (30) that if I(i) = 1 then i  2(). Therefore at the stage 3 
i() > 0. Let us determine whether it is beneficial for a client to sign a contract with a 
member of the i-th SRO under the regulation profile . 
If * *( ; ) ( ; )i iz r dr z r dr
 
     then the first term in (24) doesn’t change. The 
second one ti decreases since (28) is held as equality and pi(r) < pi(r) on certain non-zero 
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measure set . Because the fee tg is the same across the market, the client who uses the 
services of the i-th SRO has the greatest profit. Hence Фi() = 1 at the step 5. 
Since  r  , pi(r)  pg(r) then it follows from (27) that pi
g
(r) = 0. The 
probability of audit pi(r) = pi(r) for r  . Then pi
g
(r) is not altered as well as the state 
budget constraint (29). Thus, the value of the i-th SRO’s criterion in this case is 
*
* *
( ) ( ( ; ); ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1( ( ; ); ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .( )
W i gi
W i g i
Q U z r w dF w t t
z r w dF w t t U U Q
k


         
     


λ λ λ λ λλ
λ λ λ λ λ λ λ
 
Hence the regulation profile  doesn’t generate a subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Let us consider further the case when * *( ; ) ( ; ) ,i iz r dr z r dr
 
     i.e. the 
condition (30) is strict for certain r from a non-zero measure subset of . In this case 
 j  i, ( ) ( ),j iV V     hence i() = 1 at the stage 3. Only the members of the i-th 
SRO act on such market and the clients use their services if the individual rationality 
constraint (6) is held at the optimal contract z
*
(i). 
Consider a small  > 0 and assume that  
 r    pi(r) = max{pi(r) – , pg(r)}.  
In this case 
*( )U   λ  since the effective probability of the members of the i-th 
SRO audit ˆ ( ) ( )i gp r p r  and   . 
Since 
*( )U λ  is a continuous function of the regulation strategies characteristics 
then for any  > 0 there exists  > 0 such that the following inequality is held 
* * *1( ) ( ) ( ) .( ) ( )i iQ U U U Qk
     λ λ λλ λ  
Thus, in all possible cases, the deviation of the i-th SRO from the strategy i 
increases its gain, that contradicts the assumption that the profile  induces a subgame-
perfect equilibrium. ■ 
The result obtained here allows us to consider in the further analysis only the case 
when all SROs in the market establish an audit probability pi(r)  pg(r). In this case the 
state fully compensates by its actions the deviations of the SROs’ regulating strategies 
from the policy  . All agents in the market, regardless of the SROs’ strategies, are 
audited with the same probability pg(r) and pay the same penalties xg(w, r). Then the 
optimal contract z(r) and the agent’s information strategy r(w) do not depend on the 
agent’s membership in a SRO. 
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The maximum agent’s utility *( )V λ  defined by (19) does not depend on the 
strategy of the SRO, and the maximum value of the customer 
*( )U λ  (20) can be changed 
only by the fees ti and tg amendment. Lessening the i-th SRO audit probability pi is 
accompanied by a decrease in ti and an increase in tg to compensate for the additional 
costs of the state associated with increased pi
g
. This leads to the "free-rider problem", 
because the clients of the i-th SRO fully internalize the benefits from the reduction of ti, 
while the cost from increasing tg is allocated among all market participants. As a result it 
is advantageous for the SRO to reduce the probability of their members auditing. 
The following result holds. 
Proposition 3. For any given state regulation policy    all equilibria in the 
subgames starting at the stage 2 are generated by the SROs’ regulation profiles such 
that  i = 1, …, k E(pi(r(W))) = 0. 
Proof. Let us find the client’s welfare in equilibrium. Since the SRO’s and the 
state criteria (25) are decreasing functions of the amount of the fees then at the optimal 
solution the budget constraints (28) and (29) are held as equalities. Then the client’s 
welfare is  
( ( ); ) ( ( )) ( )W i gU z r z r w dF w t t

   λ
 
 
 
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Since the agents tell the truth in an equilibrium then 
 
( ( ); ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ( ( )))
( ) ( ( ( ))) ( ( ( ))) ( ) .
W g g
g j j i i g
j i
U z r z r w dF w c E p r W
c E p r W E p r W c c


   
  
    


λ
λ λ   
(31) 
It follows from Lemma 2 that in an equilibrium pi(r)  pg(r) at any non-zero 
measure set. The optimal contract z(r) and the agent’s information strategy r(w) do not 
depend on the SRO’s regulation strategy i. In addition, due to the symmetry of the 
solution  i = 1, …, k, Фi() = 
1
/k, so the welfare of the client who has a contract with a 
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member of the i-th SRO depends only on the value of E(pi(r(W))). The conditions of 
Lemma 1 in this case are satisfied only if i, j = 1, …, k, E(pi(r(W))) = E(pj(r(W))) = p . 
Then the client’s welfare is  
 ( ( ); ) ( ( )) ( ) ,W g gU z r z r w dF w c p p cp

   λ  
and the i-th SRO criterion 
  1( ) ( ( )) ( ) ,i W g gQ z r w dF w c p p cpk

   λ  
where ( ( ( )))g gp E p r W . 
Consider a situation when p  > 0. Assume that the i-th SRO reduces the 
probability of audit in such a way that E(pi(r(W)) = p  –  and sets the fee ti so that the 
budget constraint (26) is held as equality, while the regulation strategies of the other 
SROs remain unchanged. We denote the resulting regulation profile as . It follows from 
(28) that in this case  j  i, ti < tj. 
Since the values of tg and z(r(w)) which are determined at the subsequent stages of 
the game do not depend on the choice of the SRO, it is optimal for a client to make a 
contract with a member of the SRO which charges the lowest fee ti. Therefore in any 
equilibrium generated by the disturbed regulation profile  the equality Фi() = 1 holds. 
Substituting Фi() in (31), we obtain that the value of the i-th SRO criterion under 
the optimal strategies of the rest of the participants of the game at stages 3 - 11 after the 
deviation is 
 ( ) ( ( )) ( ) ( ) .i W g g gQ z r w dF w c p p cp c c

       λ  
The increase in this case is 
    1 1( ) ( ) ( ( )) ( ) .1i i W g g gk k kQ Q z r w dF w c p c c pk k k

         

 
Since   , we get that for any probability p  > 0 there exists sufficiently small 
value  such that 
( ) ( ) 0.i iQ Q  λ λ  
This result proves that the SROs’ regulation strategies belonging to the initial 
regulatory profile  cannot generate a subgame-perfect equilibrium. 
Consider now the situation when p  = 0. In this case, for any  regulatory strategy 
of the i-th SRO E(pi(r(W))  p , therefore the client’s profit after its deviation does not 
increase. As a result, under any disturbed regulatory strategies profile the value of the i-th 
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SRO criterion does not exceed Qi(), so this profile induces a subgame-perfect 
equilibrium. ■ 
The economic sense of this result is that under any state regulatory policy the 
SROs are interested in shifting the burden of the agents’ auditing to the state. This result 
contradicts the one obtained in [3, proposition 7] for the model describing a similar 
regulation mechanism in the absence of the SROs’ competition. 
Proposition 4. Any subgame-perfect equilibrium in the model 3 coincides with the 
"second-best" solution under the state regulation. 
Proof. It follows from Proposition 3 that for any state regulation strategy    
the SROs do not audit agents in an equilibrium. As a result, all inspections in an 
equilibrium are carried out only by the state. Their effective probability ˆ ( ) ( )i gp r p r  
and the fine paid by the agent when the audit detects false report is xg(w, r). 
In this case the contract offered by any agent is the same as on the state regulated 
market with the regulation policy . The expected income of the client reaches its 
maximum on the "second best" which is defined as the solution of the optimization 
problem (13) with the cost of audit equal to cg, and so does the state criterion (25). ■ 
Thus, the equilibrium established on the self-regulating market with the state 
control is identical to the one in the system with a "pure" government regulation.  
The equilibrium on the underlying market in this case coincides with the result 
obtained for the self-regulating market with the government control in [3]. However the 
ways of their formation have fundamental differences. 
In the model considered in [3] the "second best" solution is implemented entirely 
by the SROs, while the state does not perform audits in the equilibrium. Since the audit 
costs for the SROs are lower than the state ones, the welfare of the agents on this solution 
increases in comparison with the state regulation. 
In contrast, in the model 3 the SROs do not conduct audits in the equilibrium, and 
the "second best" solution is implemented by the state, which makes this equilibrium 
identical to the "pure" state regulation. In this case the introduction of the self-regulation 
in such market does not increase the clients’ welfare. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The results obtained in this paper prove that the competition of self-regulatory 
organizations is not always beneficial for the quality of the underlying market operation. 
Similar to other processes of the regulatory competition the competition of the SROs may 
be accompanied by the "race to the bottom" effect which manifests itself in the reduction 
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of the quality of the agents’ activity control and, consequently, in the decrease in the 
product or service quality on the underlying market. 
The source of this inefficiency is the specific character of "consumption" of the 
SROs’ regulatory "services". Despite the fact that the clients on the underlying market are 
the final consumers and the payers for these services, the size of the demand for them is 
determined by the agents. Therefore the regulation characteristics are determined on the 
basis of the agents’ interests and not of the clients’ ones. Due to the vertical effect of the 
competition inherent in hierarchical systems the increase in the severity of the 
competition at the level of the SROs leads to its reduction at the level of the agents and to 
the formation of the underlying market equilibria, characterized by lower consumer 
welfare. 
The peculiar and unusual feature of the SROs’ competition as compared with other 
types of regulatory competition (e.g., tax competition), is that even the creation of an 
additional control mechanism, namely the alternative state control, does not improve the 
quality of the SROs’ operation. 
The most effective means to reduce the negative effects of the SROs’ competition in 
this case is the transfer of the authority of the demand for their "services" fomation from 
the agents to the customers on the underlying market. This can be achieved, for example, 
by the introduction of the cross-auditing when the SRO controlling the quality of the 
agent’s operation is selected by the client, regardless of the agent’s membership. In this 
case, the hierarchical system considered above is divided into two adjacent markets of the 
basic products and the control services, and the demand on both of them is formed by the 
same set of clients. The vertical effects of competition in such markets are absent, resulting 
in the unilateral change in the severity of the competition. 
Moreover, in some areas the underlying market and the market of the control 
services may be merged with each other. For example, according to the Uniform Standards 
of Professional Appraisal Practice (USPAP), appraisal report expertise is not distinguished 
as an independent activity and is carried out by the appraisers in the context of the general 
requirements to the appraisal reports [24]. This suppresses the competition at the level of 
the SRO and stimulates it at the agents’ level, which has a positive effect on the quality of 
their work. 
Unfortunately, the existing Russian legislation in the sphere of self-regulation 
remains quite confusing and ambiguous. For example, the expertise of appraisal reports is 
understood in the Federal valuation standard ФСО-5 [31], as "the actions of the expert or 
experts of the self-regulating organization of appraisers in order to verify the report, signed 
by the appraiser (appraisers), which is (are) the members of the SRO..." (emphasis ours). 
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On the other hand, the legislation does not contain an explicit restriction on the 
conduct of the expertise of the appraisal reports made by members of other SROs. 
Moreover, in some cases the relevant legislative acts require mandatory report expertise 
by specially authorized bodies (e.g., in the cases of bankruptcy or state property 
manipulation). Thus, in accordance with Art. 130 "Assessment of the debtor's property" 
of the Federal law of the Russian Federation "On insolvency (bankruptcy)" [29], the 
appraisal report must be verified by the authorized body, which makes a conclusion about 
its compliance with the legislation of the Russian Federation and authenticity of the 
information used in the report. The conclusion is sent to the bankruptcy commissioner 
and the appraiser’s SRO. The SRO is required to submit its expert opinion about the 
compliance of the report with the above requirements. 
A similar procedure is provided by the Federal law "On joint stock companies" 
[27] for the appraisal reports used in the transactions involving state property (article 77), 
as well as with the compulsory redemption of the shares by major owner (Art. 84.7 and 
84.8). The latter case allows for the expertise of the report by the other SRO than the 
appraiser’s one. The requirements to this SRO and the procedure of its choice are 
determined by the federal executive body regulating the appraisal activity. 
Under this uncertainty of the legislation, the reduction of the negative effects of 
the SROs’ competition is possible by introducing direct constraints in the form of quality 
indicators of the SROs’ activities and sanctions for their violation. This can be achieved, 
for example, by legislative minimum quality standards for both the SROs and their 
members which are monitored by the state authorities. 
However, it should be noted that greater regulation of the SROs leads to the loss of 
the advantage of flexibility, which allows them to respond quickly to the changes in the 
underlying markets conditions. In this regard, a combined approach to self-regulation is 
widely used which implies a non-state authority which oversees the activities of the SRO. 
For example, according to the changes made in the Federal law "On valuation activities 
in the Russian Federation" [28] in 2006, the National Appraisal Board was created. It is 
non-profit organization comprising more than 50 percent of the SROs which unite more 
than 50% of all appraisers (Art. 24.10). The National Appraisal Board is managed by a 
collegial body, which includes, along with the SROs’ representatives, the independent 
experts, representatives of the consumers, scientific and educational community and 
other persons who are not members or representatives of the SROs. 
A similar structure, the Union of self-regulating organizations of bankruptcy 
commissioners, is formed on the market of arbitration management services in 
accordance with the requirements of the Federal law "On insolvency (bankruptcy)". 
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In other areas of professional activity, e.g. on the markets of audit or construction 
services, the supervision over the SRO is provided by the federal executive bodies [25]. 
Thus, despite the benefits of self-regulation mechanisms declared in the modern 
economic literature, the formation of a corresponding hierarchical system “SRO - agent - 
client” leads to vertical effects, which restrict the possibility of the use of market self-
organization mechanisms. This reduces the competition on the underlying market 
resulting in consumers’ welfare decrease. To compensate for these effects, the state has to 
form more complex regulatory structures thus making the market similar to the centrally 
regulated one.  
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